Taiwan has been a topic of geopolitical debate since the Kuomintang-led Republic of China government retreated to the island in 1949 following its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party. Since then, the island has remained a flashpoint for diplomatic disagreements and uncertainty. The United States maintains “strategic ambiguity” over whether it would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, while supporting the island’s defense through unofficial relations and arms sales. Against this backdrop, Beijing’s repeated calls for unification raise an increasingly pressing question: are recent military and diplomatic developments preserving stability, or are they making an already unsteady situation less predictable?
Taiwan was controlled under the Imperial Qing dynasty from 1683-1895.1 Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, the Republic of China (ROC) assumed administration of the island in 1945. Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory under its “one-China principle,” although it has never governed the island.2 Taiwan maintains its own democratic institutions, with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) holding the presidency, but has formal diplomatic relations with only 12 partners. This limited recognition does not capture the extent of Taiwan’s international relationships: the United States maintains unofficial ties and supplies defensive arms. The distinction between diplomatic recognition and security support is central to understanding the island’s position.
Military activity provides one way to assess that distinction. China’s July 23–24 live-fire exercises near Dongshan Island demonstrated its ability to conduct operations in the Strait. Such exercises can place pressure on Taiwan without beginning a war. However, an exercise alone cannot establish that an invasion is imminent. The concern is that recurring military activity could make it harder to distinguish routine signaling from preparations for escalation, leaving governments less time to judge intentions during a crisis.
This September, outside involvement offered a different signal. Two New Zealand naval vessels transited the Strait on September 18, despite Wellington having no formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. The transit suggests that Taiwan’s limited recognition does not prevent other governments from maintaining a presence in the Strait. Still, a peacetime transit does not establish how a country would respond during an attack. Its value lies in demonstrating continued interest and access, while leaving the extent of military support uncertain.
Taiwan’s own preparations also matter. At a September 9 defense forum, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim emphasized stronger defenses and societal preparedness, while American Institute in Taiwan Director Raymond Greene supported Taiwan’s self-defense and diplomatic efforts to prevent miscalculation. Taken together, these positions suggest that deterrence depends on Taiwan’s capacity to withstand pressure as well as outside assistance. Preparing for disruption could make coercion less effective. Yet public statements alone do not establish whether forces, infrastructure, and civilians are sufficiently prepared; that requires evidence of implementation.
The planned September 24 Trump–Xi summit adds another uncertainty. Reuters reported on September 17 that regional officials feared Washington might soften support for Taiwan in exchange for economic concessions. Those concerns do not prove that a concession will occur. They do, however, expose a vulnerability: Taiwan’s security depends partly on decisions made within a broader U.S.–China relationship. If Beijing interprets support for Taiwan as negotiable, diplomatic engagement could weaken the deterrent effect that Washington intends to maintain.
On September 21, the United States, Japan, and South Korea reaffirmed the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait. Coming ahead of the summit, this statement can be read as an effort to reassure regional partners while Washington engages Beijing. That combination could help manage tensions if the messages remain consistent. If public reassurance and private negotiations appear to contradict one another, however, governments may struggle to judge which commitments will hold under pressure.
On balance, September’s developments offer stronger evidence of continued support for Taiwan than of a lasting reduction in risk. Naval activity and diplomatic reassurance may discourage coercion, but uncertainty over Washington’s negotiations leaves the durability of that support open to question. The coming summit will test whether reassurance to regional partners remains consistent with engagement with Beijing. For Taiwan, greater stability requires defensive preparation and communication that reduces the chance of miscalculation. The absence of conflict would be welcome, but it would not, by itself, demonstrate that the underlying risks had diminished.