In May 2026, President Donald Trump traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Amid the pleasantries and diplomacy emerged a broad commitment between the two world powers: strategic stability. Four months later, the idea remained central to their September meeting in Washington. At first glance, a shared commitment to stability is reassuring. Yet its significance depends on what each government believes stability requires and whether those expectations can coexist when their interests collide. Can the U.S. and China sustain their commitment to “strategic stability” through a potential crisis over Taiwan?
While both leaders agreed on the terminology “strategic stability,” their public statements leave room for competing interpretations. Broad principles, however, did emerge from their discussions. Both governments emphasized the benefits of economic cooperation, but recognizing those benefits does not establish how they would respond when their security interests collide. Taiwan illustrates this uncertainty. Beijing’s account of the September meeting linked Washington’s handling of Taiwan to the foundation for broader bilateral cooperation. This suggests that economic cooperation alone may not be enough to sustain the relationship when political disagreements intensify. Strategic stability, then, should be measured by whether the two governments can maintain communication and exercise restraint when those disagreements become most consequential.
Despite their competing interpretations of stability, Washington and Beijing have practical reasons to prevent their disagreements from disrupting economic cooperation. Predictable economic relations allow businesses to plan, invest, and trade with greater confidence, while trade disputes can impose costs on businesses and consumers in both countries. In September, the White House announced that the two governments had reached consensus on recommendations for favorable tariff treatment covering $30 billion in non-sensitive goods in each direction. If implemented, this arrangement could reduce uncertainty in selected sectors of their economies. It suggests that both governments see value in preserving areas of cooperation while their broader competition continues. Yet the emphasis on “non-sensitive” goods also reveals the arrangement’s limited scope: cooperation is being pursued where the two governments consider it acceptable, leaving unresolved how it would withstand a dispute involving core security interests.
Taiwan presents a more difficult test because the disagreement concerns what each government considers necessary for security. In the September readout, Xi urged Washington to oppose Taiwanese independence. This was Beijing’s stated expectation, not evidence that Trump accepted a new position. The United States, meanwhile, maintains a legal framework for supporting Taiwan’s self-defense under the Taiwan Relations Act.1 Military assistance intended to discourage coercion can also be interpreted in Beijing as an obstacle to unification. The difficulty, therefore, is that each government can describe its own actions as preserving stability while viewing the other’s actions as undermining it. A shared commitment to avoiding conflict leaves this disagreement unresolved.
Taiwan’s own interests further complicate any understanding reached between Washington and Beijing. Speaking on September 9, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim linked stronger defenses and societal preparedness to preserving the ability of Taiwan’s people to determine their future. This introduces a standard of stability that cannot be measured solely by the condition of U.S.-China relations. An arrangement that improves relations between the two powers while making Taiwan more vulnerable to pressure would offer limited reassurance to the people most directly affected. Taiwan’s security decisions and public consent must therefore remain part of the analysis, rather than being treated as outcomes that Trump and Xi can settle between themselves.
The limits of economic cooperation could become apparent well before a full-scale invasion. Consider a hypothetical crisis in which a prolonged Chinese military exercise severely disrupts commercial access to Taiwan. Washington could face pressure to respond, while Beijing could view an American deployment as interference with what it claims as its territory. Both governments might still prefer to avoid war, yet disagree about which side must withdraw first. The prospect of lost trade would give them a reason to de-escalate, but it would not resolve the immediate dispute. If each believed that retreat would carry greater political or security costs than continued pressure, economic interdependence would provide an incentive for restraint without guaranteeing it.
In such a situation, communication would become essential to preventing a limited confrontation from expanding. Past experience shows why its availability cannot be assumed. After the United States shot down a Chinese balloon in February 2023, the Pentagon said Beijing declined a requested call between their defense chiefs. That episode does not establish how either government would behave in a future Taiwan crisis. It does, however, demonstrate the weakness of relying on communication that one side can suspend when relations deteriorate. A more durable commitment to stability would require both governments to keep military contacts available during disputes, including when answering a call is politically uncomfortable.
September produced a narrower development worth watching. The White House announced a dialogue on artificial intelligence, officially called the U.S.-China Super Intelligence Dialogue, with another exchange due by November. It also announced an agreement to establish a communication channel for related incidents. This indicates a willingness to address at least some risks through continuing contact. It should not be mistaken for a mechanism covering military confrontation over Taiwan, nor does its announcement demonstrate that it is already operational. Its relevance lies in the precedent it could set: officials agreeing in advance how to communicate about dangerous developments despite continued competition. Whether that practice extends to the Strait remains a separate question.
September’s economic commitments nevertheless offer a useful starting point. On September 25, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the intention was to keep selected goods outside future tariff disputes. A narrow arrangement may prove more durable than a broad promise if officials know which obligations remain in force during disagreement. Its value will depend on implementation and whether those protections survive the next political setback. As of writing, that durability remains untested by the announcement itself.
The September summit therefore offers evidence that Washington and Beijing want to manage their competition, but limited evidence of how they would manage a Taiwan crisis. Their commitment to strategic stability could endure if both governments accept that cooperation must continue through disagreements they cannot readily resolve. That would require functioning crisis contacts and restraint in military behavior, alongside economic commitments that survive political friction. Taiwan’s ability to make its own decisions must also remain protected; a quieter relationship between Washington and Beijing would be an incomplete measure of success if it depended on greater coercion of the island. For now, strategic stability remains a plausible objective with conditions still to be demonstrated. Its credibility will depend on the choices made when preserving it becomes costly.