Following the U.S. midterm elections, Taiwan’s defense minister offered a familiar reassurance. Wellington Koo said on November 5 that support for Taiwan’s defense would continue across party lines in Congress. Taipei has good reason to value those relationships. Yet the same Reuters report described a proposed arms package worth approximately $14 billion that remained stalled after President Donald Trump had called it a “bargaining chip” in dealings with China. The coexistence of congressional goodwill and an unresolved sale leaves Taiwan with a problem that an election result cannot settle. Taipei needs to know how much of that support it can reasonably build its defense plans around.
Taiwan should judge American reassurance more heavily by whether it produces commitments that defense planners can use. A government deciding how long to maintain an aging system needs a credible expectation of when its replacement will become available. If that date keeps moving, the consequences reach beyond the undelivered equipment. Money may have to remain committed to the older system, and personnel assigned to the transition may need different duties. These are foreseeable planning costs, even when their precise size is not public. Washington’s friends in Taipei should be able to ask who is responsible for resolving a delay without having to prove their appreciation for American support first.
Understanding that responsibility requires a closer look at what Congress actually does. Under the arms sales review process described by the Congressional Research Service, the executive branch proposes a sale and notifies Congress when the relevant legal requirements apply. Congress has an opportunity to object, and it can legislate to prohibit or modify a transaction. The process generally does not require an affirmative vote approving each sale. A lawmaker’s endorsement therefore tells Taiwan something about the political reception a proposal could receive, without establishing that the administration is ready to move it forward. Treating those two judgments as interchangeable gives a congressional statement more weight than the process supports.
Congress nevertheless has considerable influence, including the ability to turn its priorities into law. Existing legislation directs the administration to prioritize and expedite Taiwan’s Foreign Military Sales requests and prohibits delaying their processing merely to bundle them together. That instruction provides a concrete basis for oversight. Members who support Taiwan can ask how the administration is carrying it out and require an explanation when progress stalls. The provision does not give every requested weapon an automatic approval or a guaranteed delivery date. The law gives Congress a basis for asking what officials are actually doing to prioritize Taiwan’s requests.
Political decisions also need to be distinguished from difficulties later in the purchasing process. In the Foreign Military Sales program, the United States and the purchaser enter a government-to-government agreement called a Letter of Offer and Acceptance. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s implementation guidance then addresses the work of carrying out accepted agreements, including procurement and delivery. Equipment may need to be manufactured, and its arrival does not establish that the receiving force can immediately operate it. Describing everything that has yet to reach Taiwan as one undifferentiated backlog obscures where a particular case has stopped. The official who can release a proposal for further review may have little ability to fix a production problem.
This distinction matters especially when Washington connects an arms decision to negotiations with Beijing. An administration can defend such a choice as an attempt to obtain a broader diplomatic benefit. It should also explain how Taiwan is expected to manage the uncertainty that follows. Public reporting does not establish that every outstanding Taiwanese purchase has been held for the same reason, and the stalled package should not become a convenient explanation for every late delivery. Still, when a president explicitly presents a proposed sale as negotiating leverage, Taipei has grounds to ask how long its defense planning will remain contingent on a diplomatic timetable over which it has little control.
The strongest objection to demanding firmer schedules is that complex weapons programs cannot be made predictable by political insistence. Officials who promise a date before a contractor can support it may simply create another deadline to miss. Taiwan gains little from that kind of reassurance. A useful commitment would identify the next decision that can realistically be completed and explain what must happen before it is reached. Where a technical problem prevents an exact forecast, a reasonable delivery range with stated assumptions would be more useful than a precise date that conceals the uncertainty. The standard should be information that improves planning, even when the information is unwelcome.
There is also recent evidence against treating American support as an exercise in promises alone. On November 8, three additional F-16V Block 70 fighters arrived in Taiwan, following the first two on October 2. The aircraft belong to a 66-jet purchase approved in 2019. According to the Central News Agency, technical issues had pushed deliveries beyond their original timetable. The arrivals are tangible progress in a program that has attracted justified scrutiny. An assessment of American reliability needs to account for equipment that is arriving as carefully as it accounts for commitments that remain unresolved.
The Air Force’s account of that arrival is instructive for another reason. It said training to bring the aircraft into service would proceed, gradually establishing their initial operational capability. In plain terms, getting the jets to Taiwan is one part of preparing a unit to use them. That distinction should shape how both governments describe progress. Officials can properly celebrate an arrival and still owe legislators an explanation of the work remaining before the equipment can perform its intended mission. A photograph of a new aircraft offers evidence of delivery; the readiness of the force receiving it requires a different assessment.
Taipei’s own decisions can complicate the timetable. At a November 4 legislative hearing, a dispute over Stinger missile funding exposed how difficult it can be to coordinate the two sides of a purchase. Legislator Ma Wen-chun questioned releasing money before Taiwan had received the American offer. Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chen Chien-yi said the document was under review and that access to the funds would allow an initial payment once it arrived. The disagreement illustrates a real sequencing problem. Taiwan needs sufficient confidence in a purchase to authorize spending, but it also needs the ability to act when an offer becomes available.
Legislative scrutiny of that sequence is legitimate. A defense ministry should be expected to explain what it intends to buy and when payment becomes necessary. Nevertheless, withholding funds cannot resolve a decision that belongs to another government. If the American offer arrives before Taiwan’s financing is ready, a domestic funding dispute could extend a delay that began elsewhere. Both governments should be explicit about which action is outstanding and who has the authority to complete it. Otherwise, each side can point to the other’s unfinished work, leaving the military with a purchase that everyone professes to support and no dependable basis for preparing to receive it.
A more demanding congressional approach would focus on these individual cases. For major purchases, the relevant committees should seek a shared account of the stage reached and the next expected milestone. If that milestone slips, officials should explain the cause and the effect on Taiwan’s preparations, with sensitive details handled in closed briefings. Some of this information may already be available through existing reviews; the aim should be to use it to assign responsibility and resolve obstacles. Another report would accomplish little if its findings did not change the decisions holding up the purchase.
There should also be a practical consequence when an expected capability will arrive later than Taiwan’s planning assumed. The two governments should assess whether equipment already in service can cover the gap and what additional support that would require. Extending an older system’s useful life may be sensible in one case and an expensive distraction in another. Any proposed stopgap needs scrutiny of its own, particularly if it draws personnel away from preparing for the replacement. The burden should fall on officials to show how the revised plan meets the military’s needs during the additional wait. Taiwan should not have to absorb that adjustment as an unexplained consequence of a revised delivery estimate.
This would give bipartisan support a more measurable purpose when the new Congress takes office. Members who agree that Taiwan should be able to defend itself can press for explanations specific enough to distinguish a policy choice from a procurement difficulty. Taipei, in turn, should make clear which delays have the greatest consequences for its defense plans, rather than relying on a single dollar figure to convey urgency. The jets arriving this month demonstrate that progress is possible. The unresolved purchases show why that progress must be judged case by case. American reassurance becomes more credible when Taiwan can use it to make decisions about its forces, knowing what has been committed and how the consequences of a missed commitment will be addressed.