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Analysis · Cross-Strait politics

The Price of an Open Market: How Beijing Uses Trade and Culture to Press Its Claim on Taiwan

Beijing can give Taiwanese voters a reason to favor the politicians it will do business with. Persuading those voters to accept Chinese rule is a harder proposition.

By Matthew R. Floegel

Published November 16, 2026
A fish pond in Ligang, Taiwan, with mountains reflected in the water.
An aquaculture pond in Ligang, Pingtung County, Taiwan, August 2019. Photograph by Taiwankengo / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0. Displayed at reduced size.

In December 2023, seven Taiwanese fish farms received permission to sell grouper in China again. Beijing had suspended imports eighteen months earlier. Taiwan’s Fisheries Agency asked Beijing to explain why other qualified farms had been left off the list. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office had something else to say about the decision. It credited cooperation with the Kuomintang, Taiwan’s main opposition party. A fish farmer hoping to make the next list could reasonably wonder which would do more good, another inspection or a call to a politician.

That episode deserves another look as Taiwan prepares to elect its mayors and county officials on November 28. Beijing has given politicians who favor closer ties something quite specific to offer their constituents. They can make the case that a good relationship with the mainland helps them do business. Beijing can lend that argument credibility simply by choosing whose calls to return. It is a modest ambition compared with persuading Taiwanese voters to accept unification, and a considerably more realistic one.

Beijing itself describes peaceful unification as its first choice, although it explicitly reserves the right to use force. There are good reasons to prefer the quieter route. A military threat gives Taiwanese people a common danger to weigh. An offer to reopen a market presents them with different interests. Someone who raises fish for a living has rather more at stake in a customs decision than someone who writes about it. Beijing can gain a hearing in that first household without winning the argument in the second.

It is tempting to call all of this soft power, particularly when the alternative under discussion is military force. The political scientist Joseph Nye used soft power to describe the influence a country earns when other people find something about it attractive. If a Taiwanese student comes home from Shanghai more open to ties with China because of the people she met, that is the kind of influence Nye had in mind. An exporter has a different calculation. A new opportunity gives him a reason to cooperate; the prospect of losing a customer he already depends on can make disagreement expensive. Neither decision tells us much about where he would like to be governed.

Grouper makes the distinction unusually easy to see. In 2021, the year before the ban, mainland China bought about 93 percent of Taiwan’s grouper exports. Losing that market meant finding buyers for thousands of tonnes of fish. There were genuine regulatory questions. Taiwan’s own agriculture minister acknowledged a problem with producers exporting under other farms’ licenses. It would take more evidence to conclude that China invented a food safety issue. What requires no guesswork is Beijing’s decision to give a political party credit when some trade resumed. A regulator can explain what a producer must do to qualify. Crediting the KMT suggests there is somebody else the producer ought to thank.

Cheng Li-wun descends the stairs of an aircraft at Shanghai Hongqiao Airport.
KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun arrives in Shanghai at the start of her mainland visit, April 7, 2026. Video still by China News Service (中国新闻社) / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0. Displayed at reduced size.

This April, the political terms appeared in writing. After KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun met Xi Jinping in Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party’s Taiwan Work Office announced ten measures for closer ties. One proposed setting up a channel to help Taiwanese farm and fishery products enter the mainland. The products would still have to meet quarantine standards. The channel itself would rest on support for the “1992 Consensus,” a disputed understanding concerning one China, and opposition to Taiwanese independence. No individual farmer was being asked to sign a declaration. Beijing was specifying which political understanding it expected from the people who would speak on that farmer’s behalf.

The disagreement in Taipei concerned who had the authority to do that speaking. The KMT welcomed the prospect of new business and argued that contact could help preserve peace. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau chief, Tsai Ming-yen, said at the time that the elected government should lead the talks. Each position has merit. Opposition parties have every right to talk to people across the Strait, and their constituents have good reason to want them to try. The difficulty arises when Beijing welcomes an opposition delegation but declines talks with President Lai Ching-te’s administration. Voters may judge one party better able to conduct relations with China on the strength of access that China itself has decided to grant.

There is a cultural version of the same problem. After Lai’s inauguration in May 2024, China’s state broadcaster posted a statement on Weibo declaring unification inevitable. Dozens of Taiwanese entertainers shared it. Users of the platform even kept a spreadsheet of who had reposted it. Nobody reading that spreadsheet could know which artists agreed with the statement or which worried about what their silence might cost. One Taiwanese actor, Yang Hsiu-hui, did explain her own calculation. She had turned down work in China over politics. “I gave up on that market a long time ago,” she told reporters. Others may well have agreed with Beijing. What readers scrolling through Weibo saw in each repost was CCTV’s position with a familiar Taiwanese name attached to it.

Public opinion in Taiwan offers a useful check on how much to read into those endorsements. In an August survey of 1,086 adults conducted by National Chengchi University for Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, 40.9 percent of respondents gave economic development priority over sovereignty in cross-Strait exchanges. Asked separately who should decide Taiwan’s future, 83.9 percent agreed it should be decided by Taiwan’s people. The published totals do not tell us how each person answered both questions. They do suggest why an offer of better trade can attract a substantial audience in Taiwan and still fall well short of a mandate for Beijing.

Taipei has some say in how expensive it is for an individual to disagree. In October 2022, while the grouper ban was in effect, two junior high schools in Kaohsiung began serving Taiwanese grouper for lunch. A pair of school cafeterias could hardly replace the mainland market. They did, however, give producers a purchase order that nobody had to negotiate in Beijing. That is a more useful starting point for policy than asking farmers to prove their loyalty by absorbing a loss somebody else can afford.

The November elections will produce winners who favor different kinds of relations with China. It would be a mistake to read a local vote for someone who can bring back customers as a vote to put Beijing in charge. A farmer can quite reasonably want the business and want Taiwan to keep choosing its own government. The practical question for Taipei is whether that farmer will still have someone to sell to the next time those two preferences get in each other’s way.

Sources

  • Taipei Times. No Visits to ‘Special’ Grouper Farms: Agency. December 25, 2023.
  • Taiwan Central Election Commission. Briefing on Preparations for the 2026 Local Elections and National Referendum. November 12, 2026. In Chinese; PDF.
  • Taiwan Affairs Office and State Council Information Office, People’s Republic of China. The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era. August 2022.
  • Joseph S. Nye Jr. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008.
  • Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. China Lifted Its Importation Ban on Groupers from Taiwan Province of China. GLOBEFISH, January 2, 2024.
  • Central News Agency. Taiwan to Improve Grouper Industry Management After China Ban. June 22, 2022.
  • Xinhua. Mainland Unveils Package of Policies, Measures to Boost Ties With Taiwan. Published by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, April 12, 2026.
  • Reuters. Taiwan Government Should Lead Engagement With China on New Measures, Senior Official Says. April 13, 2026.
  • Hsia Hsiao-hwa and Alice Yam. Dozens of Taiwanese Celebrities Endorse Beijing’s Claim on Island. Radio Free Asia, May 27, 2024.
  • Taiwan News. Angela Chang, Rainie Yang Also Repost Chinese Claims About Taiwan’s ‘Return’. May 24, 2024.
  • Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council. Summary of August 2026 Public Opinion Survey on Cross-Strait Relations. Fieldwork by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, August 13–17, 2026. PDF.
  • Central News Agency. 2 Junior High Schools in Kaohsiung Begin Serving China-Banned Fish. October 21, 2022.

Matthew R. Floegel

Matthew R. Floegel is the founder and editor of Strait Perspective, an independent publication examining Taiwan, China, and U.S. foreign policy.

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