In December 2023, seven Taiwanese fish farms received permission to sell grouper in China again. Beijing had suspended imports eighteen months earlier. Taiwan’s Fisheries Agency asked Beijing to explain why other qualified farms had been left off the list. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office had something else to say about the decision. It credited cooperation with the Kuomintang, Taiwan’s main opposition party. A fish farmer hoping to make the next list could reasonably wonder which would do more good, another inspection or a call to a politician.
That episode deserves another look as Taiwan prepares to elect its mayors and county officials on November 28. Beijing has given politicians who favor closer ties something quite specific to offer their constituents. They can make the case that a good relationship with the mainland helps them do business. Beijing can lend that argument credibility simply by choosing whose calls to return. It is a modest ambition compared with persuading Taiwanese voters to accept unification, and a considerably more realistic one.
Beijing itself describes peaceful unification as its first choice, although it explicitly reserves the right to use force. There are good reasons to prefer the quieter route. A military threat gives Taiwanese people a common danger to weigh. An offer to reopen a market presents them with different interests. Someone who raises fish for a living has rather more at stake in a customs decision than someone who writes about it. Beijing can gain a hearing in that first household without winning the argument in the second.
It is tempting to call all of this soft power, particularly when the alternative under discussion is military force. The political scientist Joseph Nye used soft power to describe the influence a country earns when other people find something about it attractive. If a Taiwanese student comes home from Shanghai more open to ties with China because of the people she met, that is the kind of influence Nye had in mind. An exporter has a different calculation. A new opportunity gives him a reason to cooperate; the prospect of losing a customer he already depends on can make disagreement expensive. Neither decision tells us much about where he would like to be governed.
Grouper makes the distinction unusually easy to see. In 2021, the year before the ban, mainland China bought about 93 percent of Taiwan’s grouper exports. Losing that market meant finding buyers for thousands of tonnes of fish. There were genuine regulatory questions. Taiwan’s own agriculture minister acknowledged a problem with producers exporting under other farms’ licenses. It would take more evidence to conclude that China invented a food safety issue. What requires no guesswork is Beijing’s decision to give a political party credit when some trade resumed. A regulator can explain what a producer must do to qualify. Crediting the KMT suggests there is somebody else the producer ought to thank.
This April, the political terms appeared in writing. After KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun met Xi Jinping in Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party’s Taiwan Work Office announced ten measures for closer ties. One proposed setting up a channel to help Taiwanese farm and fishery products enter the mainland. The products would still have to meet quarantine standards. The channel itself would rest on support for the “1992 Consensus,” a disputed understanding concerning one China, and opposition to Taiwanese independence. No individual farmer was being asked to sign a declaration. Beijing was specifying which political understanding it expected from the people who would speak on that farmer’s behalf.
The disagreement in Taipei concerned who had the authority to do that speaking. The KMT welcomed the prospect of new business and argued that contact could help preserve peace. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau chief, Tsai Ming-yen, said at the time that the elected government should lead the talks. Each position has merit. Opposition parties have every right to talk to people across the Strait, and their constituents have good reason to want them to try. The difficulty arises when Beijing welcomes an opposition delegation but declines talks with President Lai Ching-te’s administration. Voters may judge one party better able to conduct relations with China on the strength of access that China itself has decided to grant.
There is a cultural version of the same problem. After Lai’s inauguration in May 2024, China’s state broadcaster posted a statement on Weibo declaring unification inevitable. Dozens of Taiwanese entertainers shared it. Users of the platform even kept a spreadsheet of who had reposted it. Nobody reading that spreadsheet could know which artists agreed with the statement or which worried about what their silence might cost. One Taiwanese actor, Yang Hsiu-hui, did explain her own calculation. She had turned down work in China over politics. “I gave up on that market a long time ago,” she told reporters. Others may well have agreed with Beijing. What readers scrolling through Weibo saw in each repost was CCTV’s position with a familiar Taiwanese name attached to it.
Public opinion in Taiwan offers a useful check on how much to read into those endorsements. In an August survey of 1,086 adults conducted by National Chengchi University for Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, 40.9 percent of respondents gave economic development priority over sovereignty in cross-Strait exchanges. Asked separately who should decide Taiwan’s future, 83.9 percent agreed it should be decided by Taiwan’s people. The published totals do not tell us how each person answered both questions. They do suggest why an offer of better trade can attract a substantial audience in Taiwan and still fall well short of a mandate for Beijing.
Taipei has some say in how expensive it is for an individual to disagree. In October 2022, while the grouper ban was in effect, two junior high schools in Kaohsiung began serving Taiwanese grouper for lunch. A pair of school cafeterias could hardly replace the mainland market. They did, however, give producers a purchase order that nobody had to negotiate in Beijing. That is a more useful starting point for policy than asking farmers to prove their loyalty by absorbing a loss somebody else can afford.
The November elections will produce winners who favor different kinds of relations with China. It would be a mistake to read a local vote for someone who can bring back customers as a vote to put Beijing in charge. A farmer can quite reasonably want the business and want Taiwan to keep choosing its own government. The practical question for Taipei is whether that farmer will still have someone to sell to the next time those two preferences get in each other’s way.